

Tape 38

SIDE A, 2 1/4 - 2 1/4

21 AUG 1979

REMINDER MEMORANDUM

Contact  about support to Mrs. Carter.

DCI  
21 Aug 79

### Summary

USN strategy today requires mix of sea control and power projection. Problem is to determine proportionate emphasis and readiness and where, with limited resources, one vehicle or weapons system can fulfill both roles.

### VII. Optimizing the U.S. Navy to its strategy

#### A. Understanding sea control

##### 1. Four tactics against 3 threats: air, sub, surface

- a. Destroy at base
- b. Blockade
- c. Barrier interdiction
- d. Point Defense

##### 2. Nature of all four tactics has changed:

- a. Range of weapons
- b. Accuracy of weapons
- c. Detection possibilities

##### 3. Impact of changed nature of warfare on each tactic:

- a. Destroy at base: More difficult to penetrate and sea based air always at a range disadvantage; but greater destructiveness and accuracy if do penetrate.
- b. Blockade: Difficult to do with air; requires such close in action against ships and subs that only subs can attempt; technical trends are against them as Soviet sea control areas expand.

- c. Barriers: Requires sea based air for air or ships; probably even for subs.
- d. Point Defense: must extend 3 dimensional defensive perimeter even further; requires air for rapid attack and for elevating sensors.

B. Understanding Projection of Power Ashore

1. 3 Tactics

- a. Air Strike
- b. Amphib assault
- c. Gun/Missile bombardment

2. Nature of tactics changed and impact

- a. Air Strike - air defense weapons require stand-off attacks; more accurate weapons reduce tonnage required per destruction.
- b. Amphib - small, mobile, defensive weapons make large assaults more difficult, including vulnerability of only new tactic since WWII, helo assault.
- c. Missiles may open up new possibilities, especially when consider in connection with required stand off for aircraft.

C. Understanding interplay of sea control and power projection

- 1. Clearly sea control is sine qua non for projection.
- 2. Destroy at base tactic for sea control smacks of power projection. Distinction is only in purpose--to destroy

elements contributing to enemy's sea denial capability or to destroy elements related to air or land campaigns or industrial or social strength. Importance of distinction lies in more limited nature of requirements for sea control, e.g. inland penetration not so deep, target complexes more limited, types of weapons, e.g. ~~mines may be different, etc.~~ In short, the full panoply of power projection is not a sine qua non of sea control; only a limited application of power projection tactics to the sea control mission.